There is no question that all their hopes have now been completely dashed. Indeed, this situation of "no hope after having been very hopeful" has begun to affect the general health and the state of mind of all Iranians (someone said that it was like being released into a huge vacuum that was both cold and dark). Setting aside all the social and economic difficulties, living in a society in which all the moral and human norms are easily set aside, and where the ruling establishment feels free to trample over and disregard all principles, is both painful and insulting.

While certain developments in Iran can be seen as positive and heart warming to those on the outside, the reality for people here is something else. The fact that women have been allowed to "show a little hair" or to replace their "Islamic overcoats" with jeans or other similar token gestures of this nature is hardly a response to the dire needs of the Iranian people!

While people take comfort in the fact that President Mohammad Khatami and his family are above corruption, the feeling is not the same about other members of the ruling establishment.

Politics: Confusion in this area supersedes those in the economic and social sectors. The main contingents that comprise what has become known as the "conservative right", consist of the following factions whose activities are, in the final analysis, co-ordinated by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i, who is assisted in this task by former President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani:

1. The Combatant Clergy organisation of Teheran (Rohaniyat Mobarez), led by former Prime Minister, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani (who has a reputation as being "very close to Britain").

2. The Islamic Coalition (hey’at Mo’talefeh), led by Habibollah Askar Oulady. This is group is believed to be a remnant of an Islamic terrorist organisation of the 1940's which was headed at one time by Navab Safavi (who killed Prime Minister General Haj Ali Razmara in 1949).

3. The Clerics of the Haqqani School in Qom, whose prominent figures include, Ayatollahs Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, Ali Razini, and Mohammad Yazdi (the former Head of the Judiciary).

4. Hard line clerics close to Mahdavi-Kani, such as Ayatollahs Mohammad Ali Khaz’ali and Ahmad Jannati (the Secretary of the Council of Guardians).

5. Hard line clerics, who have stayed away from any faction, but are fully compliant to the wishes of the Supreme Leader.

Recently, there have been rumours to the effect that there has been some internal quarrelling amongst these factions, with Mr. Javad Larijani, who is their main "spokesman to foreign audiences, urging for greater restraint. However, all indications point to the general perception that these groups - who are commonly referred to as an "Islamic Mafia" – genuinely think that any concession on their part will be seen as a sign of weakness, leading to their ultimate demise.

The worst examples of the Judiciary's behaviour (whom many consider to be the modern day replacement of "SAVAK", the Shah’s Intelligence and Security services), have been witnessed in such high profile trials as the cases concerning:

- The perpetrators of the attacks of student dormitories (July 1999);

- The Jews accused of spying for Israel;

- Those arrested in connection with the attempted assassination of Mr. Sa’id Hajjarian, considered as the architect of reformist victories in the 1997 presidential and 2000 Legislative elections);

- General (Sardar) Mohammad Naghdi, Commander of the Law Enforcement Forces Intelligence.

- Journalists and later those accused of "disseminating audio-tapes";

- The Khoramabad incident (unrests due to a students gathering);

- The Participants in the Berlin Conference;

- The perpetrators of the "Serial Murders";

It is possible to elaborate in great detail about the irregularities witnessed in each of these sham trials. These have included matters pertaining to the questionable authority of the courts and their justices, the types of complaints forwarded by the plaintiff (i.e., the Judiciary itself), and finally, the biased and highly suspicious testimony of key witnesses, who have all been under the direct protection of the conservative faction.

This was recently brought into more focus after political prisoners like Ezatollah Sahabi or Ali Afshari, a student activist were transferred to places no one knows were they are being held.

Mr. Sahhabi’s daughter revealed that during a visit permitted recently, his father, who is in his seventies, had been in such a bad mental shape that he was unable to recognise his family.

The important thing is that while everyone in Iran is aware of these facts and happenings, yet nothing or little is done to fight these "unlawfully cooked up" arrests and other acts of intimidation, and objections raised against these inhuman practices, like the Mujahedeenn of the Islamic Revolution Organisation (not to be confused with the Iraqi based Mujahedeen Khalq) led by former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi and the Office of Consolidating Unity (Iranian students major organisation) that, have come out with statements condemning the Judiciary's irresponsible behaviour, fail to make any impact.

They made the strategic decision to eliminate those they were unable to arrest and imprison. The attempt on the life of Mr. Hajjarian is a case in point. Although he survived the terrorist attempt, his confinement to a wheel chair has seriously reduced the extent of his activities.

Next, they used the Judiciary to close down the reformist press, without any fear of how their actions were likely to be perceived by the outside world. They followed this up by arresting, imprisoning and torturing any member of the reformist camp against whom they could build a case, with the intention of removing him or her from the political scene.

This process that was started with the arrest and imprisonment of people like Hojjatoleslams Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri, a former Interior Minister condemned to five years jail, has now expanded to include many more. Finally, by using the Council of Guardians, they disarmed the Majles from promoting the reformist agenda.

There is no question that Khatami's wings have been seriously clipped. First and foremost, he has been contained as a consequence of the arrest of people like Qolamhoseyn Karbaschi (the former Mayor of Teheran), Nouri, the forced resignation of former Culture Minister Ata’ollah Mohajerani, and most recently the removal of Mr. Mostafa Tajzadeh, the senior Deputy Interior Minister in charge of organising elections.

Khatami, whose mandate had been to honour the rule of law, further alienated the people and in particular, those who have made a heavy emotional investment in himself. Not only people cannot accept this type of attitude, no matter the justification, but also because all the avenues that linked the president to the general public has essentially been closed and the remaining reformist newspapers, fearful of being closed, have also imposed a great deal of self-censorship.

With this background in mind, public reaction towards Khatami has been as follows:

1. There are those who say that there is nothing he can do, and short of involving himself in a battle he cannot win at this time, it is best that he should keep his head down and wait for a more opportune occasion before going on the offensive;

2. On the other side, there are those who, like the Iranian youth, who constitute a majority amongst those who wish to see Khatami take on the corrupt Judiciary and the unchecked Leader, believe that you cannot hope for a better day so long as the current "Mafia Establishment" is in place. Hence, it is their belief that Khatami should appeal directly to the people, and mobilise popular support for amending the Constitution so as to rid the country of its current malaise. It is their belief that by keeping his head down, Khatami has effectively become a pawn in the hands of the conservatives.

All these uncertainties and defeats have so far made Khatami reluctant to announce his candidacy for a second term. He is clearly concerned about receiving less than half the 20 million votes he got in 1997.

Other potential candidates for this summer's election include:

1. Chairman of the Expediency Council Hashemi-Rafsanjani, though his credibility has been seriously dented and is perhaps the most dreaded public figure in contemporary Iran

2. Former Majles Speaker and Presidential candidate, Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, even though he has essentially withdrawn from further elective politics.

3. The popular Abodollah Nouri who is in Jail, and the respected former Culture Minister Mohajerani;

4. Sa’id Hajjarian;

5. Former Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Moussavi has been discouraged by his friends from contesting the elections (there are rumors that suggest the Ministry of Information is in possession of photographs that show members of his family in breach of the Islamic dress code);

6. Deputy Majles Speakers, Behzad Nabavi and Dr. Mohammed Reza Khatami (the President's brother and leader of the Islamic Iran Participation Party), as well other potential candidates like the Current Speaker, Hojjatoleslam Mehdi Karrubi or the well known reformists, Abbas Abdi, are simply devoid of sufficient 'weight' to be considered as serious candidates

7. Key people from the Conservative faction, like Mahdavi-Kani or Askar Oulady are so hated that they would never dare enter the contest.

+++++++++++++++++++