"Internal" Iranian affairs, however, also includes a segment to be found outside Iran proper. Basically, this segment is made up of Iran’s political and military allies in the region. Some of these are extremely close to Tehran, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, while others, like Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad are more in the form of strategic partners.

Still others are perceived as extensions of the Iranian regime like a number of Iraqi opposition groups, chiefly Seyyed Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim’s Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI).

But why speak of these foreign-based groups as forming part of domestic Iranian politics? Simply because relations between the Islamic Republic and these groups have become an integral part of Iran’s security and geo-political strategy. In other words, when Iranian policymakers consider what elements they have on their side especially in the context of the Middle East, they invariably count these groups among their assets. It also works the other way round, with the groups themselves seeing Iran either as a strategic ally (in the case of the Palestinian organisations), or as something more than that (in the case of (Hezbollah).

When the Iranians consider developments in Afghanistan and the American incursion into their regional sphere of influence, therefore, they do not restrict their vision to their immediate geographic surroundings, but also look further beyond, to the effects these developments might have on their other allies in the region.

As far as the Iranian government is concerned, the issue of Afghanistan started to take up more than the share of attention a domestic issue normally would when the Americans began hinting that their "war on terror" was not only about Osama Ben Laden, Al-Qa’eda and the Taleban, but would extend to include all organisations and individuals Washington considers to be involved in terrorism.

The situation became more serious (at least for some quarters in the Iranian regime) when the Americans included Imad Mughniyeh on the first list of terrorists they published. Some Iranian policymakers saw that as a message from Washington to Tehran, although it might well not have been intended as one.

Therefore, it might well have been the case that Mughniyeh was put on the terrorist list automatically. But certain factions in Tehran did not see it that way. What made matters worse was Washington’s announcement that Hizbullah is a "terrorist" organization.

It was at this point that certain political-security factions inside the Iranian regime began to realize that the Afghan crisis and President George W. Bush’s decision to finish off world terrorism have touched on a vital element of Iran’s (foreign-based) "home front." It must be stressed at this point that the Lebanese Hezbollah is considered by the Iranian leadership to be one of its closest "outer-internal" allies; the leadership in Tehran is extremely sensitive to any action that might target or harm Hezbollah much more so than any other of its foreign-based allies, including the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

While the latter two organisations are seen by Tehran as important strategic allies (especially Islamic Jihad), Hezbollah is different. The Iranian leadership considers Hezbollah as an extension of itself in the Middle East.

Iranian influence on Hezbollah is undoubtedly very strong, especially since the leadership of the party unreservedly admits its allegiance to the concept of velayet-e-faqih, and that it consequently sees that faqih (Iran’s supreme leader) as its highest religious authority whose commands have to be obeyed.

Consequently, the Iranians are not prepared to envisage Hezbollah being pursued or targeted. In fact many senior scholars in the Iranian holy city of Qom as well as many Iranian state officials declared from the very beginning that they would not abandon Hezbollah "because it is a party of resistance exercising the legitimate right of fighting (Israeli) occupation".

For their part, Iran’s "outer-internal" allies are keeping a close eye on how Tehran’s position vis-a-vis the Afghan crisis develops. It must be said in this context that Iran’s allies were extremely concerned when Iran announced, at an early stage in this crisis, that it supports the war on terror.

Iran’s initial position appeared to these groups to be an attempt to use the Afghan crisis as a means to improve its relations with the United States. They feared that the normalization of bilateral ties between Tehran and Washington would be at their expense.

This Palestinian leader subsequently declared that "there are real fears among Iran’s allies in the region that a flexible Iranian position vis-a-vis Washington would have a negative effect on the Palestinians’ struggle."

It was not surprising to see, therefore, how gratified these allies were upon learning of the tough stand that supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i subsequently adopted towards the US especially since Khameneh’i not only criticised Washington, saying that it practiced terrorism for decades, but also warned certain Iranian circles of the danger of trying to open dialogue with the United States.