The Russian-led naval exercises, which are expected to last through August 15, involve an estimated 60 vessels and 10,000 military personnel. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the exercises shortly after leaders of the five Caspian states failed to resolve lingering differences at an Ashgabat summit in April concerning the territorial division of the sea. Iran continues to insist on an equal share, or 20 percent of the Caspian Sea, a stance that many regional analysts portray as the main obstacle to a settlement.

Some officials and political scientists in Iran privately believe that one of the motivating factors for the exercises was Moscow’s desire to compel Iran to moderate its Caspian negotiating position. But the public reaction by Iranian officials has sought to shift attention away from Moscow and Tehran’s differences.

Other officials – including Ali-Akbar Velayati, the former Iranian foreign minister who is now a special advisor to Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i – suggest that Russia manoeuvres are an attempt to prevent the erosion of Moscow’s regional influence at the expense of the West, especially the United States. "Russia is trying to flex its muscle at NATO", Velayati said. "Russia is trying to tell NATO that the Caspian Sea is its [Moscow’s] own security zone and that they [NATO states] are not welcome".

At the same time, Iranian officials have provided no indication that Iran will reconsider the demand for a 20-percent Caspian share. Nevertheless, the willingness of Russia to engage in such a display of military might impair Iran’s Caspian negotiating tactics. Tehran on occasion has resorted to intimidation when addressing the Caspian question. In July 2001, for example, Iranian gunboats and aircraft confronted an Azerbaijani research vessel. The Russian naval exercises underscore the heightened risks of confrontation should Iran attempt aggressive military action on the Caspian in the future, analysts say.

The main reason for Iran’s restrained response is its economic cooperation with Russia in other strategic sectors, Iranian experts contend. Indeed, even while the two countries continue to disagree about the Caspian, Moscow and Tehran have taken steps recently to strengthen military and nuclear ties.

For its part, Russia sees Iran as a lucrative arms market. On 1 August, Rajab Safarov, head of the Moscow Centre for the Co-ordination of Russian-Iranian programs, published a memorandum detailing the long-term prospects for bilateral relations. In the memo, Safarov said the countries were using only "10 percent of the potential [economic trade] capacity". Safarov also indicated that Moscow intended to significantly expand its commercial and military trade with Tehran, including a plan to sell to Iran $5 billion worth of "non-offensive" military equipment over the next five years.

Iran, meanwhile, is eager to continue nuclear co-operation. Russia on 31 July announced that it would proceed with a decade-long nuclear program that could potentially lead to the construction of five nuclear reactors in Iran. In addition, Russian technicians will continue work on the Booshehr nuclear reactor. US officials have condemned the program, saying that Iran could utilize Russian technical expertise to develop nuclear weapons.

Many in Iranian policy-making circles have mixed feelings about Iran’s relations with Russia, suspecting that Moscow is using Tehran to gain geopolitical leverage with the United States. "The Russians are playing the Iran card with America in order to get some concessions out of them", a prominent Iranian political scientist, speaking on condition of anonymity, told EurasiaNet. Others believe that Russia’s strategic cooperation is motivated by a desire to keep Islamic radical elements in Iran from providing substantial assistance to Chechen separatists.

Editor’s Note: Mr. Ardeshir Moaveni is a freelance journalist in Tehran.

EurasiaNet published this article on 8 August.

Highlights are from IPS