It seems that the Iraqi opposition is abandoning plans for creating a government or a parliament in exile. Thus they will not be distributing seats in an imaginary government at their upcoming conference in London.

What are the goals of the conference?

The United States, whose ultimate military action against the present regime will probably be the crucial factor in ensuring change in Iraq, has already sent a letter to the participants to tell them what to do. The Iraqis gathering in London should read the letter and take its recommendations into account, but ultimately they must make their own decisions.

This is not for the sake of any false show of anti-Americanism, of the kind some Arabs excel in. The Iraqis should make their own decisions because the Bush administration is divided on the central issue of the type of regime that should succeed the present Baathist rule.

The State Department and — to a lesser extent — the CIA seem to be wedded to the vision of a "Saddam-lite" regime for Iraq. They have been looking at a string of Iraqi generals, both in exile and inside Iraq, as possible leaders of a "soft" military regime.

One attractive candidate was Nizar Al-Khazraji, a former general now living in Denmark. Khazraji, however, has been put under house arrest by the Danish authorities after a suit was filed against him on charges of crimes against humanity.

(Some Iraqis believe that Khazraji's problems were brought about by members of the Bush administration who are opposed to the State/CIA scenario.) Another candidate is former Gen. Najib Al-Salhi.

The Pentagon, backed by some more hawkish congressmen, still toy with the idea of imposing direct American military rule at least in the initial phases of the post-Saddam era. According to some reports, they have even chosen the man to do it: John Abu-Zaid, a distinguished three-star general who speaks fluent Arabic and who played a role in the last Gulf war in 1991. It is no mystery that most of Washington's Arab allies would rather a former general succeed Saddam Hussein than an American military ruler.

Powerful elements within the Republican Party prefer a civilian transition government led by Ahmad Chalabi, a former banker. The National Security Council shuttles among these contradictory positions.

The administration's internal divisions on Iraq have already led it into a problematic experiment with weapons inspections. They have also made it impossible for the U.S. to develop a coherent vision of a future Iraq. Such a vision, however, must come from somewhere. If the Iraqi opposition were to reflect divisions within the Bush administration, there would be no chance of developing an alternative vision.

This is why the London conference could play a crucial role. The participants must start with a close look at some of the lessons of history.

First, it means that Iraq's future rulers should not wear military uniforms, whether genuine army outfits or, as is the case with Saddam and his entourage, theatrical costumes.

Second, because Saddam's regime is based on a very small social base — his own clan from Takrit — the future Iraqi regime should be as broad-based as possible. It should certainly reflect the rich diversity of the Iraqi nation.

Third, because Saddam's regime is the political face of a war machine, the future regime must as un-militaristic as possible. This means disbanding the conscript army and replacing it with a highly trained and well-equipped force capable of defending the nation against foreign aggression — but not designed to intervene in domestic politics.

Fourth, because the Saddam system is based on overcentralized decision-making, the future regime should involve the whole nation in the process. This could be done through a federal system with large powers granted to local government bodies.

Fifth, the system of command economy under which the central authority controls virtually all of the nation's financial resources should be broken. A massive privatization program is needed and should include large chunks of the oil and gas industries.

Sixth, Saddam's regime has always exacted violent revenge against real or imagined adversaries. Thus the new regime should steer clear of revanchist temptations. Individuals should be primarily judged on the basis of their position today, not what they did yesterday. Iraq would need a broad amnesty, combined with a truth and reconciliation commission.

Only a few well-known criminals would have to be brought to justice. Most members of the Baath Party are there because of petty, though understandable, career calculations. Once the apparatus of tyranny and its secret services have been dismantled, most Baathists could gradually be reabsorbed into normal life.

Finally, Saddam has created a system under which the ruling elite does not need the Iraqi people for anything. The money that Saddam needs does not come from taxes but from oil exports, the black market, and extortion. Saddam does not need the people to vote for him either. (He simply announces that he has won with 100 percent of the votes.) Nor does he need the mass of the Iraqi people to fight for him. For that he relies on mercenary forces led by his sons.

Clearly, the London conferees cannot pretend that they alone can create such a regime. Forces within the country must play the central role.

You may wonder where such forces might come from, especially in a tyranny with a history of brutal repression.

Well, you would be surprised.

There are enough live forces inside Iraq to provide the principal elements of a new regime. All that is needed is a space for them to come to the fore.

Editor’s note: Mr. Taheri is a leading Iranian journalist and writer.

The National Review Online published this article on 10 December

Highlights are from IPS