Israeli officials expressed disappointment at both the US and European "reticence" over the case, even though it seems that they have some "hard facts" in their favour.

"We are disappointed by the attitude of the Americans, who refuse to admit the incontestable proof which we provided on the fact that these weapons were destined for the Palestinian Authority", said an Israeli official speaking on condition of anonymity, before the latest American reaction, as stated by the State Department’s spokesman Richard Boucher.

"We presented the captain of the ship, who admitted to the television cameras that he received his orders from close associates of Yaser Arafat", the official said, adding that Washington was "probably trying to protect Arafat, since the Americans apparently fear that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will use this affair to definitively ruin efforts by the US envoy Anthony Zinni to reach a ceasefire."

Foreign analysts blame both the Israeli hard line Premier for this blatant defiance of the West, including Americans, of most of Israeli assertions and claims against the Palestinian Authority and its Chairman, Yaser Arafat and Israeli officials for taking for granted US’s immediate and unconditional buying of their versions of events.

"Sharon has a personal vendetta against Arafat dating back to 1982 when, after his invasion of Lebanon and the Sabra Shatilla catastrophe, he failed to kill the Old Man, who, as the leader of Fatah, was considered as a terrorist", says a veteran British analyst of the Middle East, who asked not be identified.

The "Karine A" captured ship affair really has two sides, port and stern. On the one hand, the affair illustrates Israel's advantages in its dealings with the Palestinian Authority, insofar as intelligence gathering and the ability to pull off a complex, multi-faceted military operation are concerned. On the other hand, the affair is a glaring example of Israel's deficiencies in the public relations sphere.

As it turned out, in contrast to their Israeli counterparts, foreign correspondents weren't prepared to accept this Israeli account of events.

In fact, Arafat and Zinni spent part of their meeting watching the press conference convened by Israel Defence Forces Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz.

Another foreign journalist recalled that the disclosure of the capture of another weapons ship last May by Israel's navy came just a few hours after reports circulated about the death of an infant girl by IDF shelling in Khan Yunis.

"Are such sequences mere coincidences?" asked one American journalist. He responded to his own query: "I don't think so. We have the impression that Israel is trying to dictate an agenda, diverting affairs away from the peace process and Zinni's mediation efforts, and toward the mantra cherished by Sharon and Mofaz, which holds that Arafat is not relevant, and that there is no way to forge an agreement with him."

For many in the foreign press corps, Israel's conquest in the territories remains the number one issue in the region.

Foreign ministry officials claimed their security establishment colleagues tried to hog the limelight for General Mofaz, and other senior officers and passed up the opportunity to focus the public relations effort on Palestinian terrorism.

The Palestinian Authority has so far denied any involvement. Mr Arafat announced on Monday that he had launched an internal investigation into the affair. "If anything is revealed - and I personally do not think so - we will not hesitate to bring them [the culprits] before a trial", he said.

But, if that is the case, they are still working on assembling the evidence. "It is far-fetched to think that an old political fox like Chairman Arafat would fall into such a trap," said Bassam Abu Sharif, an adviser to Mr Arafat. "He told me that he regards this as a conspiracy against him. He is intelligent enough to know that such a deal would blow up all his efforts to corner Sharon back to the negotiating table."

Mr Akawi, a member of Mr Arafat's Fatah organisation since 1976, interviewed in jail by television stations on Monday, confirmed Israeli account that the shipment was bound for Palestinian territory and said a Palestinian Authority official oversaw the operation.

Adel Mugrabi is the Palestinian chief of weapons procurement, while Fathi Al Razem is the deputy commander of the Palestinian naval force, according to Israel.

"The ship loaded near an island called Kish close to Iran," he said. The course was through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean, "where three small ships would carry the weapons to Gaza port," he added.

Israeli authorities say the weapons came from Iran and the consignment was transferred from a ferry near the Persian Gulf island of Qeshm, at the entrance of the Hormuz.

If Israel's evidence proves conclusive, the question remains how the Palestinians would have got the weapons ashore undetected and how they would have deployed them.

Israeli officials say up to 800 small craft are off the coast of Gaza at any one time and any of these could slip through with arms aboard. Abu Zaki, the Palestinian naval commander, said, however, that the Israelis have the 30-mile Gaza coastline so well patrolled that "a surfboard can't cross the water, or even a fish, without being spotted by you". Western military experts are inclined to agree.

The weapons ship incident also exemplifies the hostility and lack of mutual support which plagues the work of the various bodies responsible for releasing military information and briefing foreign journalists: the IDF Spokesman, the military censor, the Foreign Ministry's press department, the Prime Minister's Office (with its two media advisers), and the Government Press Office.

But, when push came to shove after the weapons ship capture, the various Israeli bodies responsible for coordinating with the foreign press proved unable to work together efficiently.

As a consequence of personal and organisational rivalry between these different agencies and departments, major players in the foreign media, such as correspondents from CNN, Sky News and BBC, were not flown to the Prime Minister's press conference in Eilat. Journalists who could not obtain a place in the special air force plane asked for transport on another plane; this request was left unanswered.

Second, at last Friday's press conference Israel failed to provide visual aides, such as film videos of the ship or its capture.

Accounting for the hasty, poorly organized press conference, Israeli officials explain that the ship's arrival was delayed, and that the process of clearing away its 50 tons of weapons was also delayed, partly due to concerns that religious parties would object were this weapons removal work to have taken place on the Sabbath.

"Under these circumstances, and due to concerns about the story being leaked to the press, there was no choice but to hold the press conference at 2 P.M.," says a source from the Prime Minister's Office.

Officials, however, failed to launch preparations for the diplomatic-press front. The decision to convene the chief of staff's Friday afternoon press conference was reached at the last minute. The press conference was not coordinated with the Foreign Ministry.

In the end, the IDF Spokesman's statement to foreign journalists did not make explicit reference to cargo being loaded in Iran. ISRAEL CARGO CARGO 9102

Editor’s note: This article was compiled with excerpts from an article by Harvey Morris, the Jerusalem Correspondent of the Financial Times and Yosi Melman of the Israeli liberal newspaper "Ha’aretz" and reports by Safa Haeri of IPS