ASSESSING KHATAMI'S RECORD
By Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari
With the birth of the "Second Khordad Coalition" (SKC) and the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, it was hoped with great excitement that significant steps would be taken in a direction that would finally break away from the excesses of a revolution that has shattered so many lives in the process of traumatising and impoverishing the Iranian people.
However, the events that have transpired in the past 5 years have been hardly encouraging and Khatami’s failures to respond to popular calls for genuine reforms have been nothing more than a sobering experience.
In the article that follow, Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat and a consultant to the London-based "Centre for Arab-Iranian Studies" (CAIS), assesses the situation in Islamic Republic, five year after the presidency of Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami, at a time that for many Iranians, the reforms promised by Mr. Khatami are dead:
The truth of the matter is that the Iranian people were beguiled by their own assumptions and presumptions. It is also true that Khatami’s own role in trying to deceive the public was at best negligible. Yet, many Iranians hoped that having elected Khatami in the manner that explicitly rejected Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Nateq Noori, the hand picked candidate of the ruling conservatives, he would somehow steer the nation away from the same theocratic system that had ruthlessly run the country and which had also vetted him as an acceptable candidate for the presidency.
Thus, from the very outset, the only real challenging issue before the Iranian nation was how quickly would the popularly elected Head of government move in the direction of a real democracy and civil society. The people’s participation in subsequent elections (if one might truly refer to them as such, given that the only candidates on offer have always been the handpicked vetted servants of the ruling establishment) leading to further landslide victories for the Khatami camp were aimed at further enhancing the President’s mandate for serious reform.
Yet, at every critical juncture in the course of the past 5 years and to everyone’s great dismay - and this includes powerful quarters outside Iran - Khatami’s only action has been to support the very basic tenets of a system he was elected to change.
In fairness it should be said that it is not completely implausible to suggest that his cautious behaviour may have possibly prevented even more horrendous scenarios, like violent unrest and civil war, which an open challenge to the hardliners could have precipitated.
Another obvious consequence of any real challenge would no doubt have included his own survivability as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran- a factor that is often discounted by many of his friends and apologists who are anxious to stress the President’s ‘dervish-like qualities’ and his disdain for the limelight.
Nonetheless, the memory of what happened to Bani Sadr, the first Iranian president in 1981 and his consignment to the dustbin of history is still quite vivid, and Khatami supporters are well aware that in the likelihood of any open challenge to the IRI’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i, the same fate would no doubt have awaited him as well.
However, it has taken five long years for the most revealing side of Khatami to finally show itself. Indeed, it was not until 28th August 2002, when in the course of a widely publicised press conference, that Khatami’s true agenda was spelled out in a way that leaves no observer in any doubt regarding where he stands on issues most relevant to the future of the Iranian nation.
Soft spoken and genuine in his tone about the unsatisfactory state of affairs, Khatami acknowledged the fact that the country was beset by a "sick economy" and a socio-political structure that "violated the rights of the people".
Moreover, he acknowledged that Iranian graduates and technocrats whose skills were badly needed for the development of the country were eager to seek new opportunities away from a country where more than 3 million young graduates were already incapable of finding any kind of suitable employment.
While, these comments were reflective of the true state of affairs in Iran, his remedy, which urges public support to perpetuate the current theocratic system, falls massively short of public aspirations and expectations.
In the course of his interview, Khatami was crystal clear about two contentiously important issues: First, his fervent espousal of what he calls "religious democracy", and secondly, his complete and utter commitment to the provisions of the IRI Constitution. These assertions will in the coming months serve to polarize the political scene in Iran between reformers who seek to maintain the current system, albeit in a more moderate and accommodating phase, and those who will settle for nothing less than a complete overhaul that ensures the establishment of a secular democracy.
While Khatami recognises that "democracy is a process and not a project", he neglects to take into consideration the fact that this process needs to be played out on a plain playing field and not one that is unfairly structured to favour a particular constituency.
Iran is an Islamic country and most Iranians, including various outspoken supporters of secularism, do not wish to deny the importance of Islam in the country’s history and national life. But this does not mean that an "Islamic Apartheid System" should serve as a substitute for true democracy or that a theocratic constitution that bestows unacceptable authority to non-elected people should continue to indefinitely stifle the aspirations of the nation.
In his desire to perpetuate the legacy of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Khatami is faced with the problem of squaring the circle: the more Iranians become educated and aware, the more he encourages the people to assume political responsibility, the greater the risks to the theocracy he represents.
The leader of the IRI has always distrusted intellectuals, yet he needs them to help develop the country. When a leading personality expresses an independent thought, he is dismissed or even arrested, paralysing freedom of expression.
As the country gropes towards greater intellectual maturity, Khatami’s ambivalence is bound to cause him trouble and as Iran moves closer to liberation, his star as the acceptable face of an unacceptable and unpopular political system is bound to fade. Though highly unlikely, it is still possible for Khatami to make use of what is left of his opportunities to regain public confidence by moving in the direction of those who had placed their faith in him.
In historical terms, he can take solace in the fact that Gorbachev is likely to be remembered with far greater esteem than any of his Soviet predecessors. ENDS ASSESSING KHATAMI 27902
Editor’s note: The above article was published in the September 2002 issue of the Paris-based, Persian-language monthly "Roozegar No" (New Times).
Highlights and some explanatory additions are from IPS