THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER SADDAM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN
By Mehrdad Khonsari*
LONDON The aftermath of America’s pro-active policy of "pre-emption" which has swiftly removed Saddam Hoseyn’s Ba’athist regime from the seat of power in Iraq, contains important domestic and foreign policy implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) as it strives to adjust to the new circumstances that have been imposed in its neighbourhood.
On the domestic front, 24 years into the once popular Islamic Revolution that overthrew the Monarchy, some 60% of the population that is aged below 30 has virtually no recollection of the past. However, they are acutely aware of the fact that the country is beset by a sick and mismanaged economy, which has so far left more than 3 million unemployed young graduates facing a bleak future.
In a situation where the country’s once promising political reform movement has come to an ignominious halt by a socio-political structure that according to the country’s President, "violates the rights of the people", it is no wonder that increasing numbers of young Iranian graduates and technocrats – angered by the government’s inability to stem corruption and such social ills as rising drug addiction and prostitution - are anxious to embark on a massive exodus in search of new opportunities abroad, despite the fact that their skills are badly needed for the development of the country.
While President Khatami continues to urge public support for the current theocratic system, which he refers to as an "Islamic democracy", there are clear signs -- numerous strikes and demonstrations -- that his call has lost the resonance it was once able to generate. While Iranian intellectuals would agree that "democracy is a process and not a project", what they find unacceptable is the lack of a "level playing field" which violates their human rights and renders them as mere objects in what is nothing more than an "Islamic Apartheid" political system.
This growing inconsistency with "what is desired and what is on offer" is exacerbated by the transformation in Iraq where the promise of a secular democratic and federal state after years of dictatorship and suppression has greatly lifted the hopes of Iran’s multi-ethnic population for similar meaningful changes.
Therefore, the removal of Saddam (as well as the departure of the Taleban in Afghanistan), coming some eight years after the imposition of unilateral US economic sanctions which have particularly hurt Iran’s petroleum industry by depriving it of much needed investment and technological expertise, simply aggravates the Islamic regime’s sense of paranoia as it reluctantly assumes pole position, as the only remaining regional component of what President Bush has called the "Axis of Evil".
In the sphere of foreign policy, it is a fact that developments such as Iraq’s disarmament, the removal of its ruthless dictatorship, and the promotion of democracy can only be construed as positive developments which are in line with Iran’s long term national interest.
But, concerns such as Iran’s full encirclement by US allies, a potential long term decline in the price of oil once Iraq has resumed full production, and the inevitable competition for oil company investments also figure prominently in the minds of Iranian leaders.
For the present, however, the removal of Saddam Hoseyn is bound to intensify current internal debates about reassessing relations with the US and freeing the country from the clutches of a defunct and highly damaging ideological straight jacket, which has exuded gratuitous anti-US hostility beyond all points of reason.
This poses a highly sensitive dilemma for the Islamic leadership, since the core content of Iran’s foreign policy in the course of the past 24 years has been centred on a policy of militant anti-Americanism, which began with the occupation of the US Embassy and the taking of American diplomats as hostages in November 1979.
The continuing state of antagonism against the US, first under Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and now under his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i, has meant that the Islamic Republic has had to develop a pattern of intricate ties with a number of regional and international players in order to shield itself from various US counter pressures. In such calculations, just as relations with the European Union, Japan, Russia and China have been of crucial importance, so have a redefinition of Iran’s relations with its immediate neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia and its GCC partners.
Prior to "‘911", having been "sandwiched" between Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of Iraq’s defeat following the first Gulf war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Islamic leadership which has always given first priority to its own survival, had inadvertently landed in a position of tremendous comfort and advantage given the controversial nature of both those regimes and their various entanglements with the outside world.
No one would ever describe Iran’s recent relations with Afghanistan or Iraq as either fraternal or neighbourly. Yet, despite the sufferings that were inflicted on the Iranian nation as a consequence of its 8 year war with Iraq (1980-88), and Iran’s continuing sponsorship of Iraq’s militant Shiite opposition, there was never any doubt that in practical terms, Saddam was Teheran’s preferred choice for the leadership of that country once he had fallen out of favour with the United States in the aftermath of his calamitous adventure in Kuwait.
The same was to a lesser extent also true in the case of Afghanistan as well, where the fundamentalist Sunni Taleban, with its inbuilt disdain of all Shi’ites, had violated a crucial border treaty with Iran and driven its Islamic leadership to the brink of war following the murder of 13 Iranian diplomats in 1998. Yet, despite providing material support to the anti-Taleban forces of the Northern Alliance, Teheran had quietly come to appreciate the advantages of a highly controversial and Al-Qa’eda infested regime next door, which deflected world attention away from itself.
Given Iran’s much acclaimed and highly provocative involvements in trying to disrupt the Middle East peace process through its support for a number of rejectionist radical organisations, along with its contentious quest for WMD and nuclear proliferation, it follows that the forceful removal of both anti-American regimes in Kabul and Baghdad has seriously altered Iran’s strategic disposition by leaving it fully exposed to the next round of pressures in America’s continuing war against terrorism.
Unlike previous American administrations that had displayed an interest in coming to some form of an understanding with the Islamic regime, the Bush Administration, allegedly buoyed by a coalition of so-called right wing "neo-conservatives" and America’s powerful Jewish lobby, is as bent on promoting regime change in Iran as it has been in Iraq.
The only difference is that the US believes that such a mission in Iran can be accomplished through mere channels of public diplomacy, without full-scale military action. The US is aware that unlike the Arab world where public sentiment is vehemently anti-American because of America’s biased support for Israel, the reverse is in fact the overwhelming case in Iran, as proven by a recent poll that resulted in the immediate detention and imprisonment of the polltakers.
However, unlike Iraq where the US and the UK estimation of the Iraqi threat was one and the same, the periodic comments of President Bush encouraging people to stand up against the regime (as well as such action as the creation of a 24 hour medium wave radio station to target Iran’s youthful population in the hope of propelling them to take political action), are in contrast with the UK’s and the EU’s more accommodating posture which has sought to encourage an evolutionary process of reform, while cautioning Iran at times over such issues as human rights or non interference in the Middle East "Road Map".
Nonetheless, it is hardly surprising to find that the Islamic leadership should feel seriously troubled by the spectre of an unfolding "domino" that is powered by an awesome adversary who in a matter of days and with a minimum of losses had achieved a military objective which had defied the IRI after 8 years of warfare and nearly a million people in casualties (killed and disabled).
The one remaining card – a double edged sword itself --, which might offer the IRI a measure of relief in face of what can only be portrayed as recent setbacks, is the ultimate fate of the Iraqi Shi’ites and how their eventual disposition shapes up with the American army.
While Iranian meddling in Iraqi Shi’ite affairs has already led to words of caution coming out of Washington, it is nonetheless, accepted that the IRI and its Iraqi Shi’ite allies – i.e., the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) – which is led by Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Hakim, are in a prime position to make life difficult for the Americans and their plans for an interim Iraqi administration that is tasked for setting the stage for a future secular democratic and federal state.
While the prospects of a Shi’ite quagmire in Iraq may deter the US from further provocative actions against Iran, it is also possible that it may provoke them into taking counter measures, which can over time come to haunt the IRI within Iran’s own Shi’ite religious community. It is a fact that since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, all the great religious "Marja" (sources of imitation/emulation) have refused to validate the legitimacy of the current IRI Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i.
With the liberation of Iraq and removal of restrictions on Grand Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Sistani, a leading "Marja" based in Najaf with millions of followers in Iran, it is very likely that the Shi’ite religious establishment in Iran will start making itself heard much more loudly in the coming months.
In the likely event that Grand Ayatollah Sistani and his followers are not intimidated into inaction by the more radical fringe groups which have traditionally been supported by the IRI in the course of the past two decades, it is quite possible that voices of dissent emanating from religious sources within Iran will also add weight to the voice of others by publicly challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic leadership – this time on religious grounds.
Finally, the leadership in Iran is well aware that a clear implication of the Coalition’s successful war for regime change in Iraq is a potential source of threat to its own ultimate survival.
Hence, in order to sustain its rule, particularly in the face of likely increased pressures from the US, it is well aware that it must either unblock the road to serious internal reforms, or to resort to more extreme measures that is bound to jeopardize its source of support amongst its limited circle of ‘friends’ outside while pushing it ever more towards greater confrontation with a highly motivated and disgruntled population. ENDS AFTER SADDAM 27603
Editor’s note: A former Iranian diplomat, Dr. Mehrdad Khonsari is now a Senior Research Consultant at the Centre for Arab & Iranian Studies in London.
The Royal United Services Institute of London published the above article on its May 2003 issue (Vol 23 No 5).
Highlights, some editorial changes and phonetisation of names are by IPS