The disarmament agreement followed a cease-fire that led to accusations of American hypocrisy and double standards in the war against terrorism. Despite American military officials allusion to the tactical nature of the cease-fire, there were fears the US might use the MKO as a short-term bargaining chip in the crucial transitional period in Iraq.

Although some elements in the Pentagon were keen to preserve the armed status of the Mojahedeen for a brief period ｭ as a bulwark against Iranian influence ｭ it seems that the longer-term vision and strategic analysis of the State Department and the CIA prevailed.

In the eyes of the American Intelligence community, the MKO is a failed proxy force that is almost universally disliked by Iranians. Therefore whatever short-term gains were to be made by using the it as a tool of American policy in Iraq would have been dwarfed by the damage inflicted on Americas reputation. Moreover the extensive lobbying of Iranian monarchist groups, coupled with the pressure applied by Iraqi forces ｭ in particular the Kurdish PUK and the SAIRI ｭ swung the argument decisively in favour of disarmament.

State Department Richard Bouchers announcement on 9 May that the US intends to bring to an end the Mojahedeens terrorist activities inside Iraq was widely perceived in both internal and exiled Iranian political circles as a fitting end for the armed wing of an organisation intimately aligned with the ousted Ba’athist regime. The decision to disarm the Mojahedeen was also more compatible with American military action against the MKO during the Iraq war.

The MKO claimed neutrality in the recent Iraq war, but it in fact took active measures against invading American and British forces. As of March 2003, the Mojahedeen maintained 16 bases in the southern, central and north-central areas of Iraq. Virtually all of these came under attack during the war. The first attack took place on 28 March, when RAF warplanes attacked the Habib base, situated 82 kilometres north of Basra. The base was also attacked on the following day and subsequently abandoned by the MKO. The Americans bombed the massive Ashraf camp (72 kilometres northeast of Baghdad) more akin to a garrison town serving as the MKOs global headquarters, on 29 March. Ashraf was bombed again on 4 April, 12 April and 14 April.

The rapid advance of coalition armies forced the MKO to abandon all of its bases outside the north-eastern Diyala Province. The advance of US Marines from the east was met by limited MKO resistance resulting in the abandonment of the Fa’eze base (18 kilometres to the southwest of Kut) and the smaller Homayoon military outpost (32 kilometres north of Fa’eze in north-central Wasit Province)

Additionally the seemingly unassailable US Third Infantry came into direct conflict with MKO forces in the Fallujah base (the southwest of Baghdad, on the main road to Jordan). Limited combat took place between a small number of MKO fighters, who amalgamated their units with Republican Guard divisions and Iraqi militia, and the third infantry. The Fallujah base was swiftly abandoned and subsequently looted by local Iraqis. The MKOs two main bases to the north of Baghdad, Bagherzadeh and Seemorgh, were both abandoned on April 8, a day before the fall of Baghdad. The US Air Force had bombed both camps repeatedly on the April 4-5. As a result, up to 30 MKO personnel, including the camp commanders, Shahin Hatami and (Ms) Mahboobeh Soofaf, were killed.

As Baghdad fell on 9 April, the Mojahedeen assembled nearly all their forces in Ashraf. The retreat there had been preceded by the abandonment of bases in the extreme east of Iraq. During the course of this retreat MKO forces had been repeatedly ambushed by a collection of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Al-Badr Corps and Iranian IRGC fighters. For their part the Americans stepped up the bombing of the Ashraf headquarters, with a view of exacting a speedy capitulation. This capitulation was secured by April 21, and Vincent Brooks disclosed some of its details in a Central Command briefing on the following day.

The Ashraf commander, (Ms) Parichehr Bakhshaif, had directed the communications with the Americans. The main MKO communications agent with the Americans was Mehdi Bara’i, a veteran Mojahedeen activist. Indeed it was Barai who signed the cease-fire with the Americans, enabling the MKO to remain fully armed, but nevertheless effectively quarantined inside Ashraf.

The recent disarmament agreement was effectively an imposition buttressed by the US Army V Corps encirclement of Ashraf. The MKO held out for two days but was finally coerced into signing an agreement that irreversibly dismantles the armed wing of the organisation. The US military negotiator, General Ray Odierno, refused to categorise the agreement as surrender, in order to maintain some dignity for the Mojahedeen. The MKOs representative in the talks was (Ms) Mozhgan Parsai’i, the nominal head of the organisation (real power resides with Mas’oud Rajavi and his wife Maryam). The agreement stipulates the quarantining of the organisation inside Ashraf and subordinates it to complete American control. It is highly unlikely the MKO will have any form of presence in Iraq beyond the autumn of 2003.

The future of the MKO seems bleak. A seminar dedicated to assessing the future of the Mojahedeen was held in Paris on April 18. The gathering was mainly organised by around 80 ex-MKO leaders, many of whom had been previously imprisoned and mistreated by the organisation. Among the speakers was Baroness Emma Nicholson, an MEP (representing the British Liberal Democrats) who passionately argued for the disbandment of the MKO. The seminar concluded with the unanimous consensus that the MKO would disintegrate upon expulsion from Iraq.

Despite these dire predictions the MKO is unlikely to disintegrate in the near future. There is little doubt the loss of its Iraqi base will prove a devastating blow, but the group has the cohesion and resources to survive this crisis. The cohesion of the organisation derives from its self-righteous and millenarian ideology ｭ critics have argued the MKO is little more than a cult ｭ and the absolute authority of its leader, Massoud Rajavi. Hence providing Rajavi can survive the crisis (and it seems that he has), the MKO is unlikely to collapse.

Editor’s note: Mr. Mahan Abedin, a London-based financial consultant and analyst of Iranian politics, wrote this commentary for Beirut-based "The Daily Star"

Highlights, some editing and phonetisaton of names are by IPS