BEIRUT 22 Jan. (The Daily Star) Almost a century after the 1906 constitutional revolution, a new crisis is brewing in Iran, a fact highlighted by the recent decision of the Council of Guardians to bar candidates to next month’s parliamentary elections. The outcome of this nascent parliamentary struggle remains to be seen. However the implications of the contest are great not only for the 70 million Iranians who have repeatedly voted for political reform, but also for the wider Middle East region, where opposition and reformist political expression is seldom permitted.

Understanding Iran’s political landscape requires distinguishing between theory and practice. In theory, the Iranian political system has democratic manifestations, most prominently a popularly elected president and Parliament. In practice, however, un-elected institutions such as the Council of Guardians often intervene in this landscape to reject parliamentary bills and to vet, and sometimes rebuff, potential presidential and parliamentary candidates.

This vetting process is what pushed the current Majles, or Parliament, to stage a continuing sit-in to protest against the disqualification of potential candidates from the upcoming Legislative elections due on 20 February. Earlier this month the Council of Guardians barred 3,605 candidates from running (some 200 have since been reinstated), 84 of whom were incumbents, including President Mohammed Khatami’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatami, and others from the dominant reformist Second of Khordad Coalition. Candidates can be disqualified for any number of reasons, ranging from bribery charges to refusing to support the constitution, the notion of Velayat-e Faqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult) or the supreme leader.

However, the reasons for the recent disqualifications have yet to be disclosed. In solidarity with the Majles representatives, Iran’s 27 provincial governors threatened to resign, along with at least 10 members of Khatami’s Cabinet. The president himself has vacillated in his usual manner, blending statements of support such as "at this stage my historical mission is to prevent the illegal seizure of the levers of power," to appeals for compromise and concessions in line with the official position of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i.

The political chaos has emerged at a unique moment in Iranian history. Having barely recovered from the earthquake at Bam, the Iranian government has been under pressure to accommodate its domestic constituency, while also playing its hand internationally. The reform movement and Khatami’s 1997 election brought hope and promise to many Iranians, who overwhelmingly sought a reversal of the country’s international isolation and relief from the impact of the Iran-Iraq war and economic and political repression.

Such hope proved elusive, however, as conservative-dominated institutions threatened by the prospect of political transformation exerted every effort to emasculate the reform movement. And they have succeeded, with Khatami and his reformist allies blocked at every turn. Yet what many Iran analysts and policymakers have overlooked is the lack of unity among reformists themselves in the formulation of their political and economic objectives. And as reformists have pursued diverse, over-ambitious aims, they have further alienated apprehensive conservative bastions of power, such as the judiciary and the Council of Guardians.

Conservative clerics have been awaiting an opportunity to reassert control over Iran’s system, and the parliamentary elections provide the perfect occasion. However, this power play is strategically significant for other reasons besides the obvious aspiration of conservatives to tighten their hold on power. Though marginalized by the wave of popular support for the reform movement, the hardliners remain the ultimate decision-makers in Iran. By rendering the reform movement impotent, they hope to regain the initiative with a cynical population disappointed by the failed promises of the reformists.

Such changes could prolong the life span of the failing Islamic regime, albeit ephemerally since the existence of an autonomous civil society is now inherent to Iran’s political conscious.

A conservative victory and unified government could also provide a solid opening for engagement with the United States. Khatami was allowed to pursue a policy of detente and dialogue that restored Iran’s reputation with the European Union (EU) and the Arab world, but little progress has been made with the US. With no domestic reformist threat on the horizon, the conservatives may choose to pursue a policy of engagement with Washington, even compromising on such issues as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, Israel and human rights. This process would be delicate, however, as the Bush administration and the EU have opposed the undemocratic exclusion of parliamentary candidates.

Khameneh’i could intervene at the eleventh hour and allow all the disqualified candidates to run for office. By doing so he would come across as a benevolent leader supportive of democracy. This maneuver would be astute considering the apathy that has taken hold of the Iranian electorate. In light of the lack of popular participation in the last municipal elections, as well as the generally pessimistic mood among youths after the protests and arrests last summer, it is likely that the decline in voter participation will continue, enabling conservative candidates to dominate in the forthcoming elections.

Ultimately, however, the fatigue and doubt prevailing among Iran’s dynamic, young and pro-Western population will only be temporary. The seeds of political reform have been planted in the collective imagination. The future prospects for political change are undeniable, since Iran’s century-long democratic struggle has finally taken root in a blooming civil society.

A conservative clampdown, and the ensuing political respite, might in fact re-energize Iran’s vibrant population and induce Iranians to once again push for the political, economic and social reforms needed to embrace the challenges of the new century.

This struggle for self-determination is without doubt the most promising in the region and one that should be observed and championed from the sidelines. ENDS IRAN DISQUALIFICATIONS 22104

Editor’s note: Ms. Sanam Vakil, who was recently in Iran, is a doctoral candidate and lecturer in Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

The Daily Star published this article she wrote on its 22 January issue.

Highlights and some editing are by IPS